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Abstract
We consider a procurement auction, where each supplier has private
costs and submits a stepped supply function. We solve for a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and show that the equilibrium has a price instability in the sense
that a minor change in a suppliers cost sometimes result in a major change
in the market price. In wholesale electricity markets, we predict that the
bid price of the most expensive production unit can change by 1-10% due to
price instability. The price instability is reduced when suppliers have more
steps in their supply functions for a given production technology. In the
limit, as the number of steps increases and the cost uncertainty decreases,
the Bayesian equilibrium converges to a pure-strategy NE without price
instability, the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE).
Key words: Multi-unit auctions, indivisible unit, price instability, Bayesian
Nash equilibria, supply function equilibria, convergence of Nash equilibria, whole-
sale electricity markets
JEL Classication C62, C72, D43, D44, L94
Pär Holmberg has been nancially supported by the Torsten Söderberg Foundation (E37/13),
the Swedish Energy Agency (40653-1) and the Research Program the Economics of Electricity
Markets.
yUniversity of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. E-mail:
edward.anderson@sydney.edu.au.
zResearch Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm. Associate Researcher of the
Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge.
1
1 Introduction
Each year multi-unit auctions trade divisible-goods worth trillions of dollars, for
example in wholesale electricity markets and treasury bond auctions. Most multi-
unit auctions are organized as uniform-price auctions, where each accepted bid
is transacted at the clearing price. The bidding format is typically such that
each bidder submits a set of bids that together form a stepped bid function. Von
der Fehr and Harbord (1993) showed that this type of bidding format introduces
price instability; in procurement auctions there are large changes in bid prices for
small realized changes in the production cost of a supplier. They therefore argued
that approximating Nash equilibria (NE) of stepped supply functions by smooth
supply function equilibria (SFE), as in Green and Newbery (1992), is inappropriate
since this approximation cannot capture price instability. However, suppliers in
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) can only choose one bid price for their whole
production capacity and Newbery (1998) conjectured that the price instability
would become smaller with more steps in the bid functions and disappear in the
limit when the number of steps increases towards innity. In this paper we analyse
the price stability issue in detail and we are the rst to prove that Newberys
conjecture is correct. However, our results also predict that the price instability
can be signicant in practice where the number of steps is nite. We focus on
procurement auctions, but results are analogous for sales auctions.
The mechanism behind von der Fehr and Harbords result is similar to the
Bertrand-Edgeworth game (Edgeworth, 1925). A supplier would nd it optimal to
undercut a competitors bid unless the bid price is su¢ ciently uncertain or unless
its mark-up is non-positive.1 If the cost uncertainty is small, the bid price variation
therefore needs to be much higher than the cost variation in equilibrium, i.e.
price instability. In the limit where the cost uncertainty is zero, price instability
corresponds to a mixed-strategy NE as in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993).2
We consider cases where each producer submits a set of bids that together form a
stepped supply function. Thus the quantity increment of each bid becomes smaller
when each bidder submits supply functions with more steps. This decreases the
incentive to undercut one of the competitors bid prices, because there is less to
gain from undercutting if it has less impact on sales. This explains our convergence
result: the bid price uncertainty of each bid can be smaller if bidders make more
bids with smaller quantity increments.
1Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) consider uniform-pricing, which is di¤erent to the Bertrand
model. Unlike the Bertrand model, there are cases where asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria with positive mark-ups can exist in von der Fehr and Harbords model. When demand
is su¢ ciently certain and one producer is su¢ ciently dominating, then there is a pure-strategy
equilibrium where the dominating supplier makes an o¤er at the reservation price which is ac-
cepted. The competitor bids at a su¢ ciently low price to avoid that the dominating supplier
undercuts. Fabra et al. (2006) generalize this type of NE to cases with multiple bids per bidder
that form stepped supply functions.
2This is in accordance with Harsanyis (1973) purication theorem, which generally proves
that a mixed strategy NE corresponds to a Bayesian NE where small changes in an agents
private payo¤ has a large impact on its chosen equilibrium action.
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We generalize von der Fehr and Harbords (1993) model by considering a pro-
curement auction where each supplier sells a number of homogenous indivisible
units. Indivisible units could arise from restrictions in the bidding format, which
we are interested in, but also from constraints and non-convexities in the produc-
tion technology. Each supplier o¤ers each of its indivisible units at a unit price.
Suppliers have private and independent costs; each supplier receives a signal with
full information about its own production costs, but is generally imperfectly in-
formed of the competitorscosts. A supplier makes a higher bid for a higher signal
(cost), which gives rise to a bid range for each indivisible unit of the supplier, as
illustrated in Fig. 1.
We show that if the cost uncertainty is su¢ ciently small and indivisible units
are su¢ ciently small, then there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the bid
ranges for the di¤erent units of a supplier will not overlap, as illustrated in Fig.
1. We call this property step separation. In this case we can explicitly solve for
equilibria in the multi-unit auction. We prove that this is the unique equilibrium
if the auctioneers demand is uncertain and su¢ ciently evenly distributed. We
also show that the size of the bid range for a suppliers unit n (the nth cheapest
unit of a supplier) is approximately given by (I   1) (pn   cn) =n, where I is the
number of symmetric producers and pn   cn is the approximate mark-up for the
unit. From this formula and stylized facts of wholesale electricity markets, we
predict that a minor change in the cost of the most expensive production unit
could change its bid by between 1% and 10%. We predict that price instability
will be less pronounced for less expensive units in wholesale electricity markets.
As conjectured by Newbery (1998), it follows from our results that the price
instability would decrease if each supplier was allowed to submit more bids. In
our model this corresponds to a reduction in the size of indivisible units. In the
limit where costs are common knowledge and units are innitesimally small, our
Bayesian Nash equilibrium converges to Klemperer and Meyers (1989) smooth,
pure-strategy supply function equilibrium (SFE), which does not have this type of
price instability. This gives support to the use of smooth supply function equilibria
to approximate stepped supply function equilibria in wholesale electricity markets
(Anderson and Hu, 2008; Green and Newbery, 1992; Holmberg and Newbery,
2010) and treasury auctions (Wang and Zender, 2002). This type of equilibrium
convergence also appears to occur in practice. Empirical studies of the wholesale
electricity market in Texas (ERCOT) show that o¤ers of the two to three largest
rms in this market, who submit many bids per supplier, roughly match Klemperer
and Meyers rst-order condition for continuous supply functions, while the t is
worse for small producers with fewer bids per supplier (Hortaçsu and Puller, 2008;
Sioshansi and Oren, 2007). Thus, the smooth supply-function approximation is
rough in some circumstances, and models that consider details in the bidding
format are sometimes preferable in practice (Kastl, 2011; Kastl, 2012; Wolak,
2007).
A suppliers optimal set of bids for its indivisible units is determined from the
characteristics of its residual demand curve.3 When submitting its set of bids, a
3The residual demand at a specic price is given by demand at that price less competitors
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Figure 1: Illustration of price instability where small variations in costs introduces
large changes in the bid prices of a supplier. Bid and marginal cost ranges of its
indivisible units are non-overlapping in this example. In addition, the maximum
bid of one unit equals the minimum bid of the next unit. We refer to this as
step-separation without gaps.
suppliers residual demand curve is uncertain. This is due to uncertainties in the
auctioneers demand and/or uncertainties in competitors stepped supply func-
tions, because of imperfect knowledge of competitorscosts or because they ran-
domize their bids. A methodological contribution in this paper is that we develop
a discrete version of Anderson and Philpotts (2002b) market distribution function
and Wilsons (1979) probability distribution of the market price to characterize
the uncertainty of a producers residual demand. We also derive optimality con-
ditions for the best response of a producer facing a stochastic residual demand
process that has been characterized by a discrete market distribution function.
This new tool should be of general interest for theoretical and empirical studies of
auctions with multiple indivisible units. Kastl (2012) and Wolak (2007) present
related necessary optimality conditions; our main contribution is that we establish
su¢ cient conditions for global optimality of stepped o¤ers, which are crucial when
Nash equilibria are constructed in multi-unit auctions with indivisible units.
Similar to Holmberg et al. (2013), our equilibrium convergence proof partly
relies on the convergence theory for Ordinary Di¤erential Equations (ODEs). How-
ever, note that Holmberg et al. (2013) prove convergence for the case when quan-
tities are chosen from a continuous set and bid prices are chosen from a discrete
set; a setting for which price instability is not an issue.4 In our model, as in von
sales as that price.
4Pure-strategy NE exists even if supply functions are stepped and costs are common knowl-
edge.
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der Fehr and Harbord (1993), bid prices are chosen from a continuous set, while
permissible quantities are discrete, which introduces price instability.
Except for Holmberg et al. (2013), our purpose, methodology and results
signicantly depart from previous convergence studies of equilibria in multi-unit
auctions by for example Reny (1999) and McAdams (2003). These approaches use
existence of Nash equilibria for a discrete strategy space and equilibrium conver-
gence to establish that there exists equilibria in the limit game with a continuous
strategy space. Unlike them, we use a constructive approach to establish existence
by deriving expressions for the Nash equilibria. Because of the controversy raised
by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Newbery (1998), we are interested in the
properties of the Nash equilibria in multi-unit auctions and the extent to which
they exhibit price instability.
There are a number of papers (Hortaçsu and McAdams, 2010; Rostek and
Weretka, 2012; Vives, 2011; Wilson, 1979) that analyse multi-unit auctions with
divisible-goods where bidders have private information and submit smooth bid
functions. Anwar (2006) and Ausubel et al. (2014) are more similar to our study
in that they analyse Nash equilibria of stepped bid functions. However, our main
contributions do not overlap with their results, because they do not explicitly
solve for Nash equilibria in this setting, quantify the price instability or prove
equilibrium convergence. In particular, the analysis of stepped bid functions in
Ausubel et al. (2014) is limited to cases where each bidder submits two bids.
We introduce the model in Section 2. In Section 3 we derive necessary and
su¢ cient conditions, explicitly solve for Bayesian NE and prove equilibrium con-
vergence for our baseline model with a symmetric duopoly. Section 4 extends this
to multiple rms for the special case when costs are common knowledge. Section
4.1 uses stylized facts to predict price instability in wholesale electricity markets.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
In our baseline model, I = 2 producers compete in a single-shot game by bidding
in a uniform-price auction. Each rm hasN production units of equal size h with a
total production capacity q = Nh.5 Producers have private and independent costs.
The cost of each rm i is decided by a private signal i, which is chosen by nature
and which is not observed by the competitor.6 There is no loss in generality in
assuming that the range of i values is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], so that the
5Production capacities in our procurement setting corresponds to purchase constraints in
sales auctions. As an example, the U.S. Treasury auction has a 35% rule, which prevents anyone
from buying more than 35% of the auctioneers supply. This is to avoid a situation where a
single bidder can corner the market.
6Our results would change if suppliers costs were dependent. It is less critical whether a
producer receives a one-dimensional or multi-dimensional signal, such as a vector with individual
cost information for each of its production units. The Bayesian NE with step separation that
we solve for would still be the same as long as each unit has the same probability distribution
for its costs, even if the production costs of a suppliers units are imperfectly correlated.
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probability distribution of a signal is G (i) = i.7 We assume that suppliers are
symmetric ex-ante; the marginal cost for the nth unit of rm i is given by cn(i).
We suppose that cn(i) is weakly and continuously increasing in i and strictly
increasing in n. In the special case where costs do not depend on signals, i.e.
costs are common knowledge among producers, independent signals e¤ectively act
as randomization devices that help producers to independently randomize their
strategies in a mixed-strategy NE, as in the purication theorem by Harsanyi
(1973). We write Cn(i) = h
Pn
m=1 cm(i) for the total cost for producer i of
supplying an amount nh. We assume that the highest marginal cost, cN(1), is
strictly smaller than the reservation price p. In Section 4, we extend the duopoly
model to multiple suppliers.
We consider Bayesian Nash equilibria, where each producer i rst observes
its signal i and then chooses an optimal bid price pin(i) for each unit n 2
f1; : : : ; Ng. We consider cases where pin(i) is a continuous, piece-wise smooth,
strictly increasing function of its signal i and strictly increasing with respect to
the unit number n. Thus outcomes where a sharing rule is needed to clear the
auction can be neglected.
Given a value of i, we can calculate the stepped supply of rm i as a function
of price as follows:
si(p; i) = h supfn : pin(i)  pg:
Note that si(p; i) is a weakly decreasing function of i and weakly increasing
with respect to p.
Similar to von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), we assume that demand is un-
certain and inelastic up to the reservation price. The demand shock  is realized
after producers have submitted their bids and is independent of producerssig-
nals. In wholesale electricity markets the shock could correspond to uncertainty
in consumersdemand (including own production, e.g. solar power) and uncer-
tainty in the output of renewable power (e.g. wind power) or must-run plants
from non-strategic competitors.8
We consider a similar discreteness on the demand side, which is natural if
the discreteness has been imposed by the bidding format. We assume that the
demand shock  can take values on the set Q (h) = f0; h; 2h; 3h:::; 2Nhg, where
each element in the set Q (h) occurs with a positive probability. We let F () be
the probability distribution of the demand shock , i.e. F (b) = Pr (  b) with
b 2 Q (h), and let f () be the probability mass function f (b) = Pr ( = b) > 0
for b 2 Q (h).
The auctioneer clears the market at the lowest price where supply is weakly
7Note that we are free to choose the cost parameterization to achieve this. Assume that there
is some signal e with the probability distribution eG (e) and cost function ecn(e), for which this
is not true. Then we can always dene a new signal  = eG (e) and dene a new cost function
cn() = ecn( eG 1 ()), which would satisfy our assumptions.
8There is an analogous supply shock in many multi-unit sales auctions. In treasury auctions
there is often an uncertain amount of non-competitive bids from many small non-strategic in-
vestors (Wang and Zender, 2002; Rostek et al., 2010). Thus the remaining amount of treasury
securities available to the large strategic investors is uncertain.
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larger than demand.
p = inf fr :   s1(r; 1) + s2(r; 2)g :
We consider a uniform-price auction, so all accepted o¤ers are paid the clearing
price p. Thus, the payo¤ of a producer i selling n units at price p is:
i = pnh  Cn(i).
3 Analysis
3.1 Optimality conditions
We start by deriving the best response of a producer to a stochastic residual
demand. As a characterization of the residual demand, we let 	i (n; p) be the
probability that the o¤er of the nth unit of producer i is rejected if o¤ered at the
price p. This probability depends on the random demand shock  and the cost
signal j of the competitor j 6= i. Thus
	i (n; p) = Pr(   sj(p; j) < nh):
It follows on our assumptions that 	i (n; p) will be continuous and piecewise
smooth as a function of p. This probability is a discrete version of Anderson and
Philpotts (2002b) market distribution function, which corresponds to Wilsons
(1979) probability distribution of the market price. We can now show that
Lemma 1
@i (r1; r2; :::rN ; i)
@rn
= nh (	i (n+ 1; rn) 	i (n; rn)) (1)
 @	i (n; rn)
@rn
h (rn   cn(i)) ;
provided that @	i(n;rn)
@rn
exists.
In the case where the left and right derivatives of @	i(n;rn)
@rn
do not match, then
it is easy to see that (1) will still hold provided we choose either left or right
derivatives consistently. The result in (1) can be interpreted as follows. Assume
that rm i increases the o¤er price of its unit n, then there are two counteracting
e¤ects on the expected pay-o¤. The revenue increases for outcomes when the
o¤er for unit n is price-setting, which occurs with the probability 	i (n+ 1; rn) 
	i (n; rn). Thus the rst term in (1) corresponds to a price-e¤ect; the marginal
gain from increasing the bid price of the nth unit if acceptance was unchanged.
On the other hand, a higher bid price means that there is a higher risk that the
o¤er of the nth unit is rejected. This is the quantity e¤ect. The marginal loss
in prot is given by the increased rejection probability @	i(n;rn)
@rn
for the nth unit
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times the pay-o¤ from this unit when it is on the margin of being accepted. Thus
@i(r1;r2;:::rN ;i)
@rn
equals the price e¤ect minus the loss related to the quantity e¤ect.
We can identify the right-hand side of (1) as being a discrete version of An-
derson and Philpotts (2002b) Z function for uniform-price auctions.9 Thus we
dene:
Denition 1
Zi (n; rn; i) = nh (	i (n+ 1; rn) 	i (n; rn))  @	i (n; rn)
@rn
h (rn   cn(i)) ; (2)
where we take the right hand derivative of 	i if left and right derivatives do not
match.
Hence, Zi (n; rn; i) is the right hand derivative of i with respect to rn, which
is independent of other bid prices rm, where m 6= n. We use Z i (n; rn; i) to
denote the left hand derivative of i (r1; r2; :::rN ; i) in the following result.
Lemma 2 A set of bids frngNn=1 is globally optimal for producer i for signal i if:
Zi (n; rn; i)
 0 for rn  rn
 0 for rn < rn: (3)
If i is di¤erentiable at rn then a necessary condition for bids frngNn=1 to be optimal
for signal i is
Zi (n; r

n; i) = 0:
In case, the left and right derivatives di¤er at rn, the necessary condition general-
izes to
Zi (n; r

n; i)  0 and Z i (n; rn; i)  0:
Intuitively, we can interpret Lemma 2 as follows: an o¤er rn (i) is optimal for
unit n for signal i if the quantity e¤ect dominates for all prices above rn (i) and
the price e¤ect dominates for all prices below this price.
3.2 Necessary properties of an equilibrium
In this subsection, we use the optimality conditions to derive necessary properties
of an equilibrium. We will show that in many cases the equilibrium must have
the property that the lowest bid in the bid range of unit n is at exactly the same
price as the highest o¤er in the bid range for the previous unit n   1. We rst
prove that there are no gaps between the bid price ranges of successive units of a
supplier.
Lemma 3 In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, pik 1 (1)  pik (0) for each k 2 f2; : : : ; Ng,
i.e. there are no gaps between the bid ranges of successive units of a supplier
i 2 f1; 2g. Moreover, for the highest realized cost, the highest bid of supplier
i 2 f1; 2g is at the reservation price, i.e. piN (1) = p.
9Note that we have chosen our Z function to have a sign opposite to Anderson and Philpott
(2002b). Thus there is also a corresponding change in our optimality conditions.
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This result is established by showing that if player i has a gap with pik 1 (1) <
pik (0) so there is no o¤er in this range of prices, then player j 6= i can always
improve an o¤er in this range by increasing it. Thus, in equilibrium, there will
also be a matching gap in the o¤er of player j. But this implies that player i will
gain from increasing the bid pik 1 (1). This contradicts the optimality of player is
bids.
Next, we will show that price ranges of successive units do not overlap; a prop-
erty we call step separation. However, proving this requires additional conditions
on costs and the demand uncertainty. The rst condition we make use of is related
to the cost functions where we require successive units of supplier i 2 f1; 2g not
to have overlapping ranges for their marginal costs, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Assumption 1: For all n = 2:::N and  2 (0; 1)
cn 1() < cn(0): (4)
In order to characterize the uncertainty of the auctioneers demand, we nd it
useful to introduce:
Denition 2
m =
f(mh)  f((m  1)h)
f((m  1)h) : (5)
Note that both f(mh) and f((m  1)h) are non-negative, so m   1.
Assumption 2: Demand is su¢ ciently evenly distributed so that
jmj < 1=(3m) (6)
for m 2 f2; : : : ; 2Ng.
Lemma 4 Under Assumption 1 and 2, bid ranges for successive units of sup-
plier i 2 f1; 2g do not overlap in an equilibrium, i.e. pik 1 (1)  pik (0) for
k 2 f2; : : : ; Ng.10
It follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that equilibria must necessarily have
step separation without gaps, as illustrated in Fig. 1, if cost uncertainty is su¢ -
ciently small and the demand density is su¢ ciently even. In this case, we can also
prove that the Bayesian equilibrium must be symmetric.
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 1 and 2, the Bayesian NE must be symmetric, i.e.
p1n () = p
2
n () for  2 [0; 1] and n 2 f1; : : : ; Ng :
10Lemma 10 in the Appendix proves that this statement would also hold for a less stringent,
but also more complex inequality than (6).
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3.3 Existence results
In the previous section we derived necessary properties for an equilibrium - sym-
metry and step separation without gaps - for cases where the cost uncertainty
is su¢ ciently small and the demand shock is su¢ ciently evenly distributed. In
this section we establish existence of such an equilibrium for a weaker assumption
on the demand uncertainty by explicitly solving for a symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium with step separation and no gaps. If the stricter condition in (6) is
satised, then we can prove that this equilibrium is the unique Bayesian NE.
Proposition 1 The set of solutions fpn ()gNn=1 as dened by the end-conditions
pN (1) = p
pn (1) = pn+1 (0) 8n 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g
and
pn () = pn (1)
( 2n + 1)
1=(n2n)
( 2n + 1)
1=(n2n)
+ ( 2n + 1)
1=(n2n)
Z 1

cn(u) (u 2n + 1)
 1=(n2n) 1
n
du (7)
constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if Assumption 1 is satised
and
jmm+bn   (m  1) m 1+bnj  1 (8)
for all (m; bn) 2 f1; : : : ; Ng  f1; : : : ; Ng. The equilibrium is unique if, in ad-
dition, Assumption 2 is satised. Mark-ups are strictly positive in equilibrium,
pn () > cn() for  2 [0; 1].
Note that the condition in (8) is always satised if indivisible production units
are su¢ ciently small. In the special case when demand is uniformly distributed
( 2n ! 0), then (7) can be simplied to:
pn () = pn (1) e
 1
n +
Z 1

cn(u)e
 u
n
n
du:
Proposition 1 simplies as follows when costs are common knowledge. In this
limit of our model, the private signals do not inuence costs; they are simply used
as randomization devices by the producers when choosing their bids. Thus our
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium corresponds to a symmetric mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 1 The set of solutions fpn ()gNn=1 as dened by the end-conditions
pN (1) = p;
pn (1) = pn+1 (0) 8n 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g ;
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and
pn () = (pn (1)  cn)

 2n + 1
 2n + 1
1=(n2n)
+ cn; (9)
constitutes a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, if costs are common
knowledge and
jmm+n   (m  1) m 1+nj  1 (10)
for all (m;n) 2 f1; : : : ; Ngf1; : : : ; Ng. The equilibrium is unique if, in addition,
Assumption 2 is satised.
3.4 Equilibrium convergence
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of
smooth supply functions when costs are common knowledge and units are perfectly
divisible. We know from Holmberg (2008) and Anderson (2013) that there is a
unique symmetric supply function equilibrium for production capacities q when
inelastic demand has support in the range [0; 2q]. We let ~C 0 (Q) be the marginal
cost of the divisible output Q. The unique, symmetric SFE for duopoly markets
can be determined from Klemperer and Meyers (1989) di¤erential equation
P 0 (Q) =
P (Q)  ~C 0(Q)
Q
(11)
and the boundary condition P (q) = p. Note that we have rewritten the di¤erential
equation so that it is on the standard form. In this section we will refer to the
solution of this di¤erential equation as the continuous solution.
In this subsection we consider the special case where costs of the indivisible
units are common knowledge; this is in line with standard SFE models and the
model in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993). Hence, it follows from Corollary 1 and
pn 1 (1) = pn (0) that equilibrium bids for the highest signal can be determined
from the following di¤erence equation:
pn 1 (1) = ( 2n + 1)
 1=(n2n) (pn (1)  cn) + cn: (12)
A solution to this di¤erence equation is referred to as a discrete solution.
In the equilibrium convergence proof below, we consider a sequence of auctions
with successively smaller units h and larger N = q
h
, such that the exogenous
shock distribution has a well-dened continuous probability density in the limit
f (b) = limh!0
f(b)
h
and where f
0
() =f () is bounded in the interval [0; 2q]. Below
we will show that mixed-strategy NE of auctions in this sequence converges to the
SFE model in the limit as the size of the indivisible production units h decreases
towards 0. Our convergence proof goes through similar steps as in the proof of
convergence of stepped pure-strategy NE by Holmberg et al. (2013).
We rst show that the di¤erence equation in (12) converges to Klemperer and
Meyers (1989) di¤erential equation. This type of convergence is referred to as
consistency in the numerical analysis of di¤erential equations (Le Veque, 2007).
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Lemma 6 The di¤erence equation
pn 1 (1) = ( 2n + 1)
 1=(n2n) (pn (1)  cn) + cn (13)
can be approximated by
pn (1)  pn 1 (1) = pn (1)  cn
n
   (pn (1)  cn)
2n
+O
 
h3

and is consistent with the di¤erential equation in (11) if
nh ! Q
cn ! ~C 0(Q)
and
cn < pn (1)
when h! 0.
If we let the error be the di¤erence between the continuous and discrete so-
lutions, then the convergence of the di¤erential and di¤erence equations (consis-
tency) ensures that the local error that is introduced over a short price interval
is reduced as the size of the production units, h, becomes small. However, this
does not ensure that the discrete solution will converge to the continuous solution
when h ! 0, because accumulated errors may still grow at an unbounded rate
along a xed interval as h becomes smaller and the number of production units
increases. Hence another step in the convergence analysis is to establish stability,
i.e. that small changes in pn (1) does not drastically change pn (0). This is veried
in the proposition below. The proposition also shows that the converging discrete
solution is a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let P (Q) be the unique pure-strategy continuous supply function
equilibrium for divisible units, then there exists a corresponding mixed-strategy
NE for indivisible units with properties as in Corollary 1, which converges to the
continuous supply function equilibrium in the sense that pn (i) ! P (nh) when
h! 0 and cn ! ~C 0(nh). If jf
0
(x)j
f(x)
< 1
3x
, i.e. the slope of the probability density of
the demand shock is relatively small in the limit, then this ensures that the mixed-
strategy NE is the unique equilibrium in the auction with indivisible units when
h! 0.
As shown by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), the SFE for divisible units is ex-post
optimal and it does not depend on the demand shock distribution. This is di¤erent
to our model for indivisible units where equilibrium bids do depend on the demand
uncertainty when h > 0. If indivisible production units are su¢ ciently small or if
demand shocks are su¢ ciently uniformly distributed, then m is close to zero, and
second-order e¤ects are negligible. For such cases, Lemma 7 below establishes that
the bid price pn increases when the di¤erence f(2nh)   f((2n  1)h), and hence
 2n, increases. Recall that we consider a symmetric duopoly with step separation,
so the bid price of a suppliers unit n, pn, is inuenced by the properties of the
demand shock distribution near 2n units, which is captured by  2n.
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Figure 2: Bids for the unique, symmetric mixed-strategy NE in a duopoly market
with uniformly distributed demand where each producer has 5 indivisible units,
each with the size 2.
Lemma 7 @pn(i)
@2n

2n=0
 0 for every n 2 f1; : : : ; Ng and i 2 [0; 1]. The in-
equality is strict unless n = N and i = 1.
We end this section with some simple examples. When the demand is uniformly
distributed (so  2n = 0), we obtain from (9) that:
pn () = (pn (1)  cn) e 1n + cn.
We illustrate this formula in Figure 2 and Figure 3 for 5 and 20 units per rm,
respectively. In Figure 3 we also compare our equilibrium for indivisible units with
the supply function equilibrium for divisible goods. Formulas for the latter can be
found in Anderson and Philpott (2002a) and Holmberg (2008). The comparison
illustrates that the supply function equilibrium approximation works well in this
example.
4 Extension: Multiple rms
In this section we generalize results to I  2 rms for the special case when costs
are common knowledge. We use K = I   1 to denote the number of competitors
of a supplier.
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Figure 3: Bids for the unique, symmetric mixed-strategy NE in a duopoly market
with uniformly distributed demand where each producer has 20 indivisible units,
each with the size 0.5. The equilibrium is compared with an SFE for divisible-
goods.
Proposition 3 In an oligopoly market with I = K + 1  2 symmetric producers
with costs that are common knowledge, the set of solutions fpn ()gNn=1 as dened
by the end-conditions
pN (1) = p
pn (1) = pn+1 (0) 8n 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g
and
pn () = cn + (pn (1)  cn) e 
R 1
 g(u)du=n; (14)
where  is a random variable that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] and
g (u) =
K 1P
v=0
K!
(K 1 v)!v!u
v (1  u)K 1 v f ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
KP
v=0
K!
v!(K v)!u
v (1  u)K v f ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
; (15)
constitutes a symmetric mixed-strategy NE, if
jmm+Kn   (m  1) m 1+Knj  1 (16)
for all (m;n) 2 f1; : : : ; Ng  f1; : : : ; Ng.
(16) is satised when demand is su¢ ciently close to a uniform distribution or
when units are su¢ ciently small. In case demand is uniformly distributed, we
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have from Proposition 3 and the binomial theorem that
g (u) =
K
K 1P
v=0
(K 1)!
(K 1 v)!v!u
v (1  u)K 1 v
KP
v=0
K!
v!(K v)!u
v (1  u)K v
=
K (u+ 1  u)K 1
(u+ 1  u)K = K:
This gives the result below, where the approximation in (18) follows from a Taylor
expansion of (14).
Corollary 2 In an oligopoly market with uniformly distributed demand and I =
K + 1  2 symmetric producers with costs that are common knowledge among
bidders, the set of solutions fpn ()gNn=1 as dened by the end-conditions
pN (1) = p
pn (1) = pn+1 (0) 8n 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g
and
pn () = cn + (pn (1)  cn) eK( 1)=n; (17)
where  is a random variable that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1],
constitutes a symmetric mixed-strategy NE. The bid range of the mixed-strategy
NE can be approximated from:
pn (1)  pn 1 (1) = (pn (1)  cn)K
n
+O
 
h2

: (18)
It follows from Corollary 2 that equilibrium bids for the highest signal can be
determined from the following di¤erence equation:
pn 1 (1) = pn (0) = cn + (pn (1)  cn) e K=n: (19)
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6 in the Appendix, we can use (18) to prove that
this di¤erence equation is consistent with the rst-order condition of an SFE for
multiple rms. It follows from Corollary 2 that
@pn 1 (1)
@pn (1)
= e K=n 2 [0; 1] ; (20)
which ensures that the discrete solution is numerically stable also for multiple
rms. Thus we can use an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 2 to show
that the mixed-strategy NE in Corollary 2 converges to a pure-strategy SFE also
for I  2 rms.
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4.1 Price instability in wholesale electricity markets
In Figure 4, we illustrate Corollary 2 for 6 rms and 20 indivisible units per rm.
Each indivisible unit has the size 0.5, so that each rm has the maximum output
10. As expected from the theory on smooth SFE (Holmberg, 2008), this graph also
illustrates that mark-ups tend to be convex with respect to output in oligopoly
markets. This becomes even more pronounced in a more competitive market,
where mark-ups are essentially zero far below the production capacity and then
take o¤ near the production capacity. This is consistent with hockey-stick bid-
ding that has been observed in practice, i.e. observed bid prices and estimated
mark-ups become drastically larger near the total production capacity of the mar-
ket (Hurlbut et al., 2004; Holmberg and Newbery, 2010). In this case, mark-ups
will be largest and the bid range will be widest for units with the highest mar-
ginal cost. Typically wholesale electricity markets have reservation prices in the
range $1.000-$100.000/MWh (Holmberg et al., 2013; Stoft, 2002), which normally
is signicantly higher than the marginal cost of the most expensive unit. Mar-
ket concentration in wholesale electricity markets as measured by the Herndahl
Hirschman Index (HHI) is typically in the range 1000-2000, both in Europe (New-
bery, 2009) and U.S. (Bushnell et al., 2008). This degree of market concentration
can be represented by 5-10 symmetric rms. From the discussion in Holmberg et
al. (2013) and Green and Newbery (1992), it is reasonable to assume that each
representative rm submits 50-500 bids each. From these stylized facts, it follows
from (18) that the bid range of the most expensive unit is signicant, 1-10% of
the reservation price. However, it is rare that bids from the most expensive units
are accepted in wholesale electricity markets. Typically this only occurs 0.1% of
the time or even more seldom. The price instability is expected to be lower for
less expensive units that typically have smaller mark-ups. In practice producers
have sold some of their output in advance with forward contracts. As shown by
Newbery (1998) and Holmberg (2011) this lowers mark-ups in electricity markets,
and accordingly it should also mitigate price-instability.
5 Conclusions
We consider a procurement multi-unit auction where each supplier makes a bid
for each of its homogenous indivisible units. This set-up can represent restric-
tions in the bidding format, which is our main interest, but also restrictions in
the production technology, such as production constraints or non-convex costs.
Producers have private information on their costs. A producer submits a higher
bid for a unit when its costs are higher. This gives a bid range for each unit of the
supplier. We show that if the cost uncertainty is su¢ ciently small and units are
su¢ ciently small, then there exists a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which the bid
ranges for the di¤erent units of a supplier do not overlap. We call this property
step separation. In this case we can explicitly solve for equilibria in the multi-unit
auction. We prove that this is the unique equilibrium if the auctioneers demand
is uncertain and su¢ ciently evenly distributed. This Bayesian NE has a price in-
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Figure 4: Bids for the unique, symmetric mixed-strategy NE bids in an oligopoly
market with 6 rms and uniformly distributed demand.
stability. A small cost change for a unit can have a much larger impact on the bid
price of the unit. The length of the bid range for a production unit n (which is the
nth cheapest unit of a supplier) is approximately given by (I   1) (pn   cn) =n,
where I is the number of producers and pn   cn is the approximate mark-up for
unit n. We estimate that minor cost changes can change the bid price of the most
expensive unit in wholesale electricity markets by 1-10%. We predict that the
price instability will be lower for cheaper units in electricity markets, and when
producers hedge their output by selling forward contracts.
As price instability worsens welfare for risk averse market participants, there
are advantages with market designs that mitigate price instability. The price
instability decreases when producers are allowed to submit more bids. We prove
that the Bayesian NE of our set-up converges to a pure-strategy, smooth supply
function equilibrium (SFE) without price instability when both the unit size and
cost uncertainty decreases towards zero. This result gives support to the use of
smooth SFE to approximate bidding with stepped supply functions in wholesale
electricity markets, as in Green and Newbery (1992). Previously, the convergence
of stepped SFE to smooth SFE has been established by Holmberg et al. (2013)
for cases where ticks-sizes are large and the size of indivisible units is small, so
that price instability is not an issue. We also believe that price instability can
be avoided in market designs with piece-wise linear supply functions, as in the
wholesale electricity markets in the Nordic countries, Nord Pool, and France,
Power Next.
The paper also contributes by introducing a discrete version of Anderson and
Philpotts (2002b) market distribution function and Wilsons (1979) probability
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distribution of the market price. We use this tool to characterize the uncertainty
in the residual demand of a producer. We also derive conditions for the globally
best response of a producer facing a given discrete market distribution function.
These conditions can be used in both empirical and theoretical studies of auctions
with multiple indivisible units.
Similar to SFE (Anderson, 2013; Holmberg, 2008) our uniqueness result relies
on the auctioneers demand varying in a su¢ ciently wide range. More equilibria
would occur if this demand range was reduced. If demand was certain and pro-
duction capacities non-restrictive, then there is likely to be a continuum of similar
equilibria for indivisible units, as is the case for continuous SFE of divisible units
(Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). In this case, it has been popular in the literature
that analyses bidding formats with stepped bid functions to select the equilib-
rium that does not have price instability. When bidderscosts/values are common
knowledge this corresponds to selecting a pure-strategy NE, as in von der Fehr
and Harbord (1993), Kremer and Nyborg (2004a;2004b) and Fabra et al. (2006).
These NE are rather extreme, the market price is either at the marginal cost or
reservation price. Similar bidding behaviour has been observed in the capacity
market of New Yorks electricity market, which is dominated by one supplier and
where the demand variation is small (Schwenen, 2012). Still, we are not convinced
that NE without price instability will always be selected when the demand vari-
ation is small. Especially as the price instability becomes smaller if bidders are
allowed to choose more steps in their supply functions. With su¢ ciently many
steps, a market participant would not be able to notice the price instability in
markets or experiments, it would become negligible in comparison to erratic be-
haviour of the agents and other types of noise. Under such circumstances it does
not seem likely that price instability would be a reliable criterion for equilibrium
selection.
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Appendix A: Optimality conditions
In the proofs, we nd it convenient to identify the values of  that give rise to bid
prices for given units n. We dene
bi(p; n) = sup(i : si(p; i)  nh); n = 1; 2:::; N;
with bi(p; n) = 0 if si(p; 0) < nh. Thus bi is the probability that rm i will sell
at least n units at the clearing price p. It follows from our assumptions for pin(i)
that bi is increasing, continuous and piece-wise smooth with respect to the price
and decreasing with respect to n. To simplify our equations, we set bi(p; 0) = 1
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and bi(p;N + 1) = 0. We let
bi(p; n) = bi(p; n)  bi(p; n+ 1)  0.
Thus bi(p; n) is the probability that an i value is chosen by nature such that
an agent will sell exactly nh units at price p.
Lemma 8 The expected prot of producer i for a set of bids frngNn=1 and a signal
i is given by:
i (r1; r2; :::rN ; i) =
NP
n=1
(	i (n+ 1; rn) 	i (n; rn)) (nhrn   Cn(i))
+
NP
n=1
R rn+1
rn
@	i(n+1;p)
@p
(nhp  Cn(i)) dp;
(21)
where we choose @	i(n+1;p)
@p
to equal the right hand derivative of 	i at the points
where left and right derivatives do not match.
Proof. We rst calculate the probability that producer i sells exactly n units.
This can occur under two di¤erent circumstances. In the rst case, rn is price-
setting. This occurs when the nth unit of producer i is accepted and the com-
petitors last accepted unit has a bid below rn. The probability for this event is
	i (n+ 1; rn) 	i (n; rn).
Next we consider the case where producer i sells exactly n units at a price
p 2 (rn; rn+1), which is set by the residual demand of producer i. This occurs when
the nth unit of producer i is accepted and the competitors last accepted unit has
a bid in the interval (rn; rn+1). The probability that the competitor has its last
accepted bid in an interval [p; p+ p] is given by 	i (n+ 1; p+ p) 	i (n+ 1; p).
When the derivative exists, this approaches @	i(n+1;p)
@p
p as p! 0. Thus we can
write the total expected prot of the rm as in (21). By assumption 	i (n+ 1; p)
has only isolated points where it is non-smooth, and consequently the choice of
derivative value at these points will not a¤ect the integral.
Proof. (Lemma 1) We have from (21) that
@i (r1; r2; :::rN ; i)
@rn
=

@	i (n+ 1; rn)
@rn
  @	i (n; rn)
@rn

(nhrn   Cn(i))
+nh (	i (n+ 1; rn) 	i (n; rn))
+
@	i (n; rn)
@rn
((n  1)hrn   Cn 1(i))
 @	i (n+ 1; rn)
@rn
(nhrn   Cn(i)) ;
which can be simplied to (1).
Proof. (Lemma 2) Suppose (3) is satised and that there is another set
of bids frngNn=1, such that i (r1; r2; :::rN ; i) < i (r1; r2; :::rN ; i). This leads to
a contradiction, because it follows from (3) and (2) that @i(r1;r2;:::rN ;i)
@rn
 0 for
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almost all rn  rn and that @i(r1;r2;:::rN ;i)@rn  0 for almost all rn  rn. Thus
the prot must (weakly) decrease as the set of bids is changed from frngNn=1 to
frngNn=1. We realize that this change can be done in steps without violating the
constraint that bids must be monotonic with respect to n. Hence, the necessary
conditions follow straightforwardly from the denition in (1).
We can derive the following result for the duopoly market that we are studying.
This shows how 	i and Zi can be expressed in terms of bj values.
Lemma 9 In a duopoly market
	i (n; p) =
NX
m=0
bj(p;m)F ((n+m  1)h) ; (22)
and
Zi (n; rn; i) = nh
NX
m=0
bj(rn;m)f((n+m)h)
 h (rn   cn(i))
N 1X
m=0
@bj (rn;m+ 1)
@rn
f((n+m)h) (23)
where we interpret @bj
@rn
as a right derivative where left and right derivatives di¤er.
Proof. An o¤er of n units at price p by producer i is rejected if the competitor
j 6= i o¤ers exactlym units at the price p, which occurs with probabilitybj(p;m),
when demand at this price is less than n + m units, which has the probability
F ((n+m  1)h). We get 	i (n; p) in (22) by summing across all m 2 f0; : : : ; Ng.
It now follows from Lemma 1 and (22) that
Zi (n; rn; i) = nh
 
NX
m=0
bj(rn;m)f((n+m)h)!
 h (rn   cn(i))
NX
m=0

@bj (rn;m)
@rn
  @bj (rn;m+ 1)
@rn

F ((n+m  1)h)
= nh
 
NX
m=0
bj(rn;m)f((n+m)h)!
 h (rn   cn(i))
N 1X
m= 1
@bj (rn;m+ 1)
@rn
F ((n+m)h)
+h (rn   cn(i))
NX
m=0
@bj (rn;m+ 1)
@rn
F ((n+m  1)h) :
which can be simplied to (23), because @bj(p;0)
@rn
=
@bj(p;N+1)
@rn
= 0.
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Appendix B: Necessary properties of a duopoly
equilibrium
Proof. (Lemma 3) Assume to the contrary that pik 1 (1) < p
i
k (0) for some
k 2 f2; : : : ; Ng. Thus for any price in the range  pik 1 (1) ; pik (0) agent i sells
exactly (k   1)h units. In other words bi(p; k   1) = 1 and bi(p;m) = 0 for
p 2  pik 1 (1) ; pik (0) and m 6= k   1.
Now, rst suppose that producer j makes some o¤er in this price range. Hence
there is some en, e with ep = pjen(e) 2  pik 1 (1) ; pik (0). Then @bi(p;m)@p = 0 at ep, and
so, from Lemma 9 and Denition 1,
Zj (en; ep; e) = @j (r1; r2; :::rN ; e)
@ren = enh
NX
m=0
bi(ep;m)f((en+m)h)
= enhf((en+ k   1)h) > 0
because f((en+ k   1)h) > 0 (we assume that every value of demand up to 2N is
possible). Hence producer j would gain from increasing its bid for unit en when
observing signal e. This cannot occur in equilibrium, and so we deduce that
there is no o¤er from producer j in the range
 
pik 1 (1) ; p
i
k (0)

. This implies that
@bj(p;m)
@p
= 0 for p in this range. With a similar argument as above, it now follows
that
Zi(k   1; p; 1) = @j (r1; r2; :::rN ; 1)
@rk 1
= (k   1)h
NX
m=0
bj(p;m)f((k   1 +m)h)
= (k   1)hf((2k   2)h) > 0;
for p 2  pik 1 (1) ; pik (0). Hence, producer i will gain by increasing its bid for unit
k 1 when observing signal i = 1. Hence the strategy is not optimal for producer
i and again we have a contradiction. We can use the same argument to rule out
that piN (1) < p:
Lemma 10 Under Assumption 1, bid ranges for successive units of supplier i 2
f1; 2g do not overlap in an equilibrium, i.e. pik 1 (1)  pik (0) for k 2 f2; : : : ; Ng,
if
f ((n  2)h) <  nf ((n  1)h) and f ((n  1)h) <  nf (nh) (24)
where
 n =

n  1
n  2

min [f ((n  3)h) ; f ((n  2)h)]
max [f ((n  2)h) ; f ((n  1)h)]
for n 2 f3; : : : ; Ng.
Proof. We let piZ be the highest price at which there is an overlap for i, thus
we have piZ = p
i
ki 1 (1) > p
i
ki
(0) for some ki, and pik 1 (1)  pik (0) for k > ki.
Without loss of generality we can assume that piZ  pjZ and we will need to deal
separately with the two cases piZ = p
j
Z and p
i
Z > p
j
Z .
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First we take the case that they are equal. By assumption, bid prices are
strictly increasing with respect to the number of units for a given signal, so
piki (1) > p
i
Z > p
i
ki 2 (1) and p
i
Z > p
j
kj 2 (1). Thus we may nd p0 with p
i
Z >
p0 > maxfpiki 2 (1) ; pjkj 2 (1) ; piki (0) ; pjkj (0)g. In this case, we can identify signals
jX , 
j
Y , 
i
X , 
i
Y in the range (0; 1), such that p0 = p
j
kj 1
 
jX

= pjkj
 
jY

=
piki 1 (
i
X) = p
i
ki
(iY ) in the equilibrium. By assumption p
i
n () is strictly increas-
ing with respect to n and  below the reservation price. Thus iX > 
i
Y and
jX > 
j
Y . Moreover,
bj (p0; n) =
8>><>>:
1 for n  kj   2
jX for n = kj   1
jY for n = kj
0 for n  kj + 1;
and
bj (p0; n) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for n  kj   1
1  jX for n = kj
jX   jY for n = kj
jY for n = kj + 2
0 for n  kj + 3:
It now follows from Lemma 9 that :
Zi
 
ki; p0; 
i
Y

= kih(1  jX)f((ki + kj   2)h) (25)
+kih
 
jX   jY

f ((ki + kj   1)h)
+kih
j
Y f ((ki + kj)h)
 h  p0   cki(iY ) kjX
m=kj 1
@bj (p0;m)
@p
f ((ki +m  1)h) ;
Zi
 
ki   1; p0; iX

= (ki   1)h(1  jX)f((ki + kj   3)h) (26)
+(ki   1)h
 
jX   jY

f ((ki + kj   2)h)
+(ki   1)hjY f ((ki + kj   1)h)
 h  p0   cki 1(iX) kjX
m=kj 1
@bj (p0;m)
@p
f ((ki +m  2)h) :
From (24) we observe that
 =
 
jX   jY
  
 ki+kjf ((ki + kj   1)h)  f ((ki + kj   2)h)

(27)
+jY
 
 ki+kjf ((ki + kj)h)  f ((ki + kj   1)h)

> 0
We will write
fmax = max [f ((ki + kj   2)h) ; f ((ki + kj   1)h)] ;
fmin = min [f ((ki + kj   3)h) ; f ((ki + kj   2)h)] :
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Then
 ki+kj
 
p0   cki(iY )
 kjX
m=kj 1
@bj (p0;m)
@p
f ((ki +m  1)h)
=

ki + kj   1
ki + kj   2
0BB@fmin  p0   cki(iY ) kjX
m=kj 1
@bj (p0;m)
@p
f ((ki +m  1)h)
fmax| {z }
1
1CCA


ki + kj   1
ki + kj   2
0BB@fmin  p0   cki 1(iX) kjX
m=kj 1
@bj (p0;m)
@p
f ((ki +m  2)h)
fmin| {z }
1
1CCA
So we have from (25) and (27):
 ki+kjZi
 
ki; p0; 
i
Y

 kih ki+kj(1  jX)f((ki + kj   2)h)
+kih
  
jX   jY

f ((ki + kj   2)h) + jY f ((ki + kj   1)h)

+ kih
 h

ki + kj   1
ki + kj   2
0@ p0   cki 1(iX) kjX
m=kj 1
@bj (p0;m)
@p
f ((ki +m  2)h)
1A :
Now

ki+kj 1
ki+kj 2



ki
ki 1

and so ki 

ki+kj 1
ki+kj 2

(ki   1). We deduce from (26)
that
 ki+kjZi
 
ki; p0; 
i
Y
  kih ki+kj(1  jX) (f((ki + kj   2)h)  f((ki + kj   3)h))
+

ki + kj   1
ki + kj   2

Zi
 
ki   1; p0; iX

+ kih: (28)
It follows from our assumptions that bj (p0;m) is piece-wise di¤erentiable. We
consider a presumed equilibrium. Hence, provided that we do not choose p0 where
some bj (p0;m) is non-smooth, we deduce from the necessary conditions in Lemma
2 that
Zi
 
ki   1; p0; iX

= 0 (29)
and
Zi
 
ki; p0; 
i
Y

= 0: (30)
By assumption pin () is continuous with respect to . Thus by choosing p0 below
and su¢ ciently close to piZ , and thereby X close enough to 1, we can ensure that
the right hand side of (28) is strictly greater than zero, which would contradict
(30). This leads to the conclusion that piZ = p
j
Z cannot occur in equilibrium.
The next step is to consider the case where piZ > p
j
Z . We choose p0 with
piZ > p0 > maxfpiki 2 (1) ; piki (0) ; pjZg. In this case, we can identify signals iX , iY
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in the range (0; 1), such that p0 = piki 1 (
i
X) = p
i
ki
(iY ). Moreover from Lemma
3 we can deduce the existence of mj and j for which p0 = pjmj(
j). Thus
bj (p0; n) =
8<:
1 for n  mj   1
j for n = mj
0 for n  mj + 1;
and
bj (p0; n) =
8>><>>:
0 for n  mj   1
1  j for n = mj
j for n = mj + 1
0 for n  mj + 2:
Now we can use Lemma 9 to show
Zi
 
ki; p0; 
i
Y

= kih
 
(1  j)f((ki +mj   1)h) + jf ((ki +mj)h)

 h  p0   cki(iY ) @bj (p0;mj)@p f ((ki +mj   1)h) ;
Zi
 
ki   1; p0; iX

= (ki   1)h
 
(1  j)f((ki +mj   2)h) + jf ((ki +mj   1)h)

 h  p0   cki 1(iX) @bj (p0;mj)@p f ((ki +mj   2)h) :
The rest of the proof follows from a contradiction achieved using the same argu-
ment as above, with mj instead of kj and a single term
@bj(p0;mj)
@p
.
Proof. (Lemma 4) Below we show that (6) is su¢ cient to satisfy the
conditions for Lemma 10. We can deduce immediately from Denition 2that
jnj < 1=(3n) implies that:
f((n  1)h) >

3n
3n+ 1

f(nh); (31)
and
f(nh) >

3n  1
3n

f((n  1)h): (32)
There are two inequalities in (24) that we need to establish. The rst inequality
can be written
(n  1)f ((n  1)h) min [f ((n  3)h) ; f ((n  2)h)]
> (n  2)f ((n  2)h) max [f ((n  2)h) ; f ((n  1)h)] :
We have to check four cases.
(a) (n 1)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  3)h) > (n 2)f ((n  2)h) f ((n  2)h): From (31)
applied at n  2 we have
f ((n  3)h) >

3n  6
3n  5

f((n  2)h) (33)
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and with (32) applied at n  1 we have
f((n  1)h) >

3n  4
3n  3

f((n  2)h): (34)
Since
(n  1)

3n  6
3n  5

3n  4
3n  3

=

3n  4
3n  5

(n  2) > n  2;
we establish the inequality we require.
(b) (n 1)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  2)h) > (n 2)f ((n  2)h) f ((n  2)h): From (34)
we can deduce
(n  1)f ((n  1)h) >

n  4
3

f((n  2)h) > (n  2)f((n  2)h);
which immediately implies the inequality.
(c) (n 1)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  3)h) > (n 2)f ((n  2)h) f ((n  1)h): From (33)
we obtain
(n 1)f((n 3)h) > (n 1)

3n  6
3n  5

f((n 2)h) = (n 2)

3n  3
3n  5

f((n 2)h);
which immediately implies the inequality.
(d) (n   1)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  2)h) > (n   2)f ((n  2)h) f ((n  1)h): This is
immediate.
Now we turn to the other inequality, we need to establish:
(n  1)f (nh) min [f ((n  3)h) ; f ((n  2)h)]
> (n  2)f ((n  1)h) max [f ((n  2)h) ; f ((n  1)h)] :
Again we have four cases to check.
(a) (n  1)f (nh) f ((n  3)h) > (n  2)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  2)h): Using (32) and
(33) we have
(n  1)f (nh) f ((2n  3)h) (35)
> (n  1)

3n  1
3n

3n  6
3n  5

f((2n  1)h)f((n  2)h): (36)
Since (n  1) (3n  1)  n(3n  5) = n+ 1 > 0 we have (n  1)  3n 1
n
  
1
3n 5

> 1
which is enough to show the inequality we require.
(b) (n   1)f (nh) f ((n  2)h) > (n   2)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  2)h): Since (n  
1) (3n  1) 3n(n 2) = 2n+1 > 0, we deduce that (n 1)  3n 1
3n

> n 2. Then
the inequality follows from (32).
(c) (n   1)f (nh) f ((n  3)h) > (n   2)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  1)h): From (31) at
n  1 we see that
f((n  2)h) >

3n  3
3n  2

f((n  1)h): (37)
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Together with (35) we deduce that
(n  1)f (nh) f ((n  3)h)
>
(n  1)
n

3n  1
3n  5

3n  3
3n  2

(n  2)f((n  1)h)f((n  1)h):
Since (n   1)(3n   1)(3n   3)   n(3n   5)(3n   2) = 5n   3 > 0, we have
(n 1)
n
 
3n 1
3n 5
  
3n 3
3n 2

> 1 and the result is established.
(d)(n   1)f (nh) f ((n  2)h) > (n   2)f ((n  1)h) f ((n  1)h): But from (32)
and (37) we deduce
(n  1)f (nh) f ((n  2)h) > (n  1)

3n  1
3n

3n  3
3n  2

f((n  1)h)f((n  1)h):
However since (n  1)(3n  1)(3n  3)  3n(3n  2)(n  2) = 3n2 + 3n  3 > 0 we
have (n  1)  3n 1
3n
  
3n 3
3n 2

> n  2, and the inequality follows.
Lemma 11 Consider a duopoly market where each producer has step separation
without gaps in its bidding strategy and consider a price p where there is a unique
unit bn (p) such that bj(p; bn) 2 (0; 1), where producer j 6= i is the competitor of
producer i. In this case,
Zi (n; rn; i) = nhbj (rn; bn(rn)) (f ((n+ bn(rn))h)  f ((n+ bn(rn)  1)h))
+nhf ((n+ bn(rn)  1)h)
 h (rn   cn(i)) @bj (rn; bn(rn))
@rn
(rn) f ((n+ bn(rn)  1)h) ;(38)
The rst-order condition of a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, so that bn(rn) =
n and bi(rn; n) = bj(rn; n) = b(rn; n) is given by:
(b(rn; n) 2n + 1)n = (rn   cn(b(rn; n))) @b (rn; n)
@rn
: (39)
Proof. For m < bn(p) we have bj(p;m) = 1 and for m > bn(p) we havebj(p;m) = 0. Thus it follows from Lemma 9 that
Zi (n; rn; i) = nh (bj (rn; bn(rn))  0) f ((n+ bn(rn))h)
+nh (1  bj (rn; bn(rn))) f ((n+ bn(rn)  1)h)
 h (rn   cn(i)) @bj (rn; bn(rn))
@rn
f ((n+ bn(rn)  1)h) ;
which gives (38). In a symmetric equilibrium bn(rn) = n, which yields (39), because
the rst-order condition is that Zi (n; rn; i) = 0 and we can divide all terms by
hf ((2n  1)h).
Proof. (Lemma 5) It follows from the necessary rst-order condition im-
plied by (38) and Zi (n; rn; i) = 0 that pin (i) > cn(i) for i 2 [0; 1] and
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n 2 f1; : : : ; Ng. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, it can be
shown that rms must submit identical bids for the lowest cost realization, i.e.
p11 (0) = p
2
1 (0). The two rms also have identical costs ex-ante, before signals have
been realized. Thus it follows from the Picard-Lindelöf theorem that the solution
of the symmetric system of di¤erential equations implied by (38) can only have
a symmetric solution, such that p11 () = p
2
1 () for  2 [0; 1]. Under the stated
assumptions, it follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that steps are necessarily
separated without gaps, so that pik (1) = p
i
k+1 (0). Thus, we can repeat this argu-
ment N   1 times to show that p11 () = p21 () for  2 [0; 1] and n 2 f1; : : : ; Ng :
Appendix C: Existence results
Lemma 12 The rst-order conditions for the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium
when cn (1) < pn (1) = pn+1 (0) has a unique symmetric solution for unit n:
pn () = pn (1)
( 2n + 1)
1=(n2n)
( 2n + 1)
1=(n2n)
+ ( 2n + 1)
1=(n2n)
Z 1

cn(u) (u 2n + 1)
 1=(n2n) 1
n
du
> cn();
where
p0n () > 0: (40)
Proof. In order to solve (39) we write the bid price as a function of the signal.
We have @b(rn;n)
@rn
= 1
p0n()
where rn = pn () and  = b(rn; n). Thus
( 2n + 1)n =
(pn ()  cn())
p0n ()
p0n () 
pn ()
( 2n + 1)n
=   cn()
( 2n + 1)n
: (41)
Next we multiply both sides by the integrating factor ( + 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n).
p0n () ( + 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n)   pn () ( + 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n) 1
n 2n
=  cn() ( + 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n)
( + 1= 2n)n 2n
;
so
d
d

pn () ( + 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n)

=  cn() ( + 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n) 1
n 2n
:
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Integrating both sides from  to 1 yields:
pn (1) (1 + 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n)   pn () ( + 1= 2n) 1=(n2n)
=
Z 1

 cn(u) (u+ 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n) 1
n 2n
du;
so
pn () = pn (1)
( + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n)
(1 + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n)
+ ( + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n)
Z 1

cn(u) (u+ 1= 2n)
 1=(n2n) 1
n 2n
du;
which can be immediately written in the form of the Lemma statement. Thus
pn ()  pn (1) ( + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n)
(1 + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n)
+
( + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n) cn()
h
  (u+ 1= 2n) 1=(n2n)
i1

= (pn (1)  cn()) ( + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n)
(1 + 1= 2n)
1=(n2n)
+ cn() > cn().
Finally, it follows from (41) that p0n () > 0, because we know from Denition 2
that  2n + 1  1    0.
Proof. (Proposition 1) The solution is given by the end-conditions and
Lemma 12 above. We will now verify that this is an equilibrium using the opti-
mality conditions in Lemma 2.
i) Prove that Zi (m; p; i)  0 if p 2 (pm (i) ; pm (1)). It is known from Lemma
12 that the rst-order solutions are monotonic. Thus bi (p;m)  i and so
cm(bi (p;m))  cm(i). Thus, it follows from Lemma 11 that
Zi (m; p; i)  mhbj (p;m) (f (2mh)  f ((2m  1)h)) +mhf ((2m  1)h)
 h (p  cm(bi (p;m))) @bj(p;m)@p f ((2m  1)h) = Zi (m; p; bi (p;m)) = 0:
(42)
ii) Prove that Zi (m; p; i)  0 if p 2 (pn (0) ; pn (1)) where n > m. For any price
p 2 (pn (0) ; pn (1)), we can nd some signal ei such that pn (ei)  p. It follows
from the argument above that
Zi (n; p; ei)
f ((2n  1)h)h = nbj (p; n))  2n + n  (p  cn(ei)) @bj (p; n)@p  0: (43)
Now consider unit m < n with signal i at the same price p:
Zi(m;p;i)
f((n+m 1)h)h = mbj (p; n) n+m +m  (p  cm(i)) @bj(p;n)@p
 mbj (p; n) n+m +m  (p  cm(1)) @bj(p;n)@p = Zi(m;p;1)f((n+m 1)h)h : (44)
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We have from the inequality in (8) that  ((m+ 1) n+m+1  mn+m) + 1  0 for
 2 (0; 1), so
Zi(m;p;i)
f((n+m 1)h)h  Zi(m;p;1)f((n+m 1)h)h  (m+ 1) bj (p; n) n+m+1 +m+ 1
  (p  cm+1(ei)) @bj(p;n)@p = Zi(m+1;p;ei)f((n+m)h)h : (45)
Starting with (43), we can use the expression above, to recursively prove that
Zi (m; p; i)  0;
if m  n  1.
iii) Prove that Zi (m; p; i)  0 if p 2 (pm (0) ; pm (i)). It is known from
Lemma 12 that the rst-order solutions are monotonic. Thus bi (p;m)  i and
so cm(bi (p;m))  cm(i). Thus, it follows from Lemma 11 that
Zi (m; p; i)  mhbj (p;m) (f (2mh)  f ((2m  1)h)) +mhf ((2m  1)h)
 h (p  cm(bi (p;m))) @bj(p;m)@p f ((2m  1)h) = Zi (m; p; bi (p;m)) = 0:
iiii) Prove that Zi (m; p; i)  0 if p 2 (pn (0) ; pn (1)) where m > n. For any price
p 2 (pn (0) ; pn (1)), we can nd some signal ei such that pn (ei)  p. It follows
from an argument similar to (42) that
Zi (n; p; ei)
f ((2n  1)h)h = nbj (p; n)  2n + n  (p  cn(ei)) @bj (rn; n)@p  0: (46)
Now consider unit m > n with signal i at the same price p:
Zi(m;p;i)
f((n+m 1)h)h = mbj (p; n) n+m +m  (p  cm(i)) @bj(p;n)@p
 mbj (p; n) n+m +m  (p  cm(0)) @bj(p;n)@p = Zi(m;p;0)f((n+m 1)h)h : (47)
We have from (8) that  (  (m  1) n+m 1 +mn+m) + 1  0 for  2 (0; 1), so
Zi(m;p;i)
f((n+m 1)h)h  Zi(m;p;0)f((n+m 1)h)h  (m  1) bj (p; n) n+m 1 +m  1
  (p  cm 1(ei)) @bj(p;n)@p = Zi(m 1;p;ei)f((n+m 2)h)h : (48)
Starting with (46), we can use the expression above, to recursively prove that
Zi (m; p; i)  0;
if m  n+ 1.
Finally, the uniqueness result follows from the necessary conditions in Lemma
3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. We can rule out symmetric equilibria where pN () = p
for some  2 [0; 1). This would imply that events where both rms have o¤ers
at the reservation price at the same time would occur with a positive probability.
Due to the properties of the sharing rule, a rm would then nd it protable to
unilaterally deviate by slightly undercutting p for signal .
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Appendix D: Equilibrium convergence
Proof. (Lemma 6) A discrete approximation of an ordinary di¤erential equa-
tion is consistent if the local truncation error is innitesimally small when the
step length is innitesimally small (LeVeque, 2007). The local truncation error
is the discrepancy between the continuous slope and its discrete approximation
when values pn in the discrete system are replaced with samples of the continuous
solution P (nh). The di¤erence equation can be written as follows:
pn 1 = ( 2n + 1)
 1=(n2n) (pn   cn) + cn
We have  2n =
f(2nh) f((2n 1)h)
f((2n 1)h) , so  2n ! f
0(2nh)h
f(2nh)
when h ! 0. By assumption
f 0(2nh)
f(2nh)
is bounded, so  2n = O (h). By means of a MacLaurin series expansion we
obtain:
pn 1 = cn + (1  1=n)

1 +

2n

(pn   cn) +O
 
h3

pn 1 = cn +

1  1=n+ 
2n

(pn   cn) +O
 
h3

pn   pn 1
h
= (pn   cn) =(nh)   (pn   cn)
2nh
+O
 
h2

:
This gives a discrete estimate of the slope of the continuous solution if we
replace values in the discrete system are replaced with samples of the continuous
solution P (nh). To calculate the local truncation error, n, subtract this discrete
estimate of the slope from the slope of the continuous solution, so
n =
P (nh)  C 0(nh)
nh
  (pn   cn) =(nh) +O (h) ; (49)
Hence, it follows from our assumptions that lim
h!0
n = 0.
Proof. (Proposition 2) Lemma 6 states that the discrete di¤erence equation
is a consistent approximation of the continuous di¤erential equation. To show that
the discrete solution converges to the continuous solution, it is necessary to prove
that the stepped solution exists and is numerically stable, i.e., the error grows at
a nite rate over the nite interval [a; b], where a = ~C 0 (0) and b = p. The proof is
inspired by LeVeques (2007) convergence proof for general one-step methods. It
follows from Lemma 6 that
dpn 1 (1)
dpn (1)
= ( 2n + 1)
 1=(n2n) =
1
( 2n + 1)
1=(n2n)
2 [0; 1] ;
because  2n + 1  1 when  2n  0 and  2n + 1  1 when  2n  0. Thus
we can introduce a Lipschitz constant  = 1 (LeVeque, 2007) that uniformly
bounds
dpn 1(1)dpn(1)  for each h. Dene the global error at the quantity nh by En =
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pn (1)   P (nh). It follows that the global error satises the following inequality
at the unit N   1:EN 1 = jpN 1 (1)  P (nh)j   EN + h N  ; (50)
where N is the local truncation error as dened by (49). SimilarlyEk = jpk (1)  P (kh)j   Ek+1+ h k+1 : (51)
Let max 
k for k 2 f1; : : : ; Ng. From the inequality in (51) and  = 1, we can
show by induction: Ek  N k EN + NP
m=k+1
h jmjm k 1
 EN + (N   k   1)hmax
 EN +Nhmax = EN + maxq:
(52)
The consistency property established in Lemma 6 ensures that the truncation error
max can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing h. Moreover, pN (1) = P (q) = p,
so
EN  = 0. Thus from (52), Ek ! 0 when h ! 0, proving that the discrete
solution converges to the continuous one.
We note that the inequality (8) is satised when h is su¢ ciently small. Hence,
it follows from Corollary 1 that the discrete solution corresponds to a mixed-
strategy NE. The uniqueness condition corresponds to Assumption 2 when h! 0.
Proof. (Lemma 7) We have from Corollary 1 that
pn (i) = (pn (1)  cn)

i 2n + 1
 2n + 1
1=(n2n)
+ cn
It can be shown that
@pn (i)
@ 2n

2n=0
= (pn (1)  cn) e
1
n
(i 1)
2n
 
1  2i
  0:
Thus for the same or higher pn (1), a higher  2n will result in a higher pn (i) if
h is su¢ ciently small, so that  2n ! 0. We have pN (1) = p irrespective of  2n.
Thus for symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria with step separation without gaps,
so that pn 1 (1) = pn (0), and su¢ ciently small h, a weakly higher  2n will weakly
increase pn (i) for n 2 f1; : : : ; Ng.
Appendix E: Multiple rms
Consider an oligopoly market with I producers. Let ' i (p;m) be the probability
that the K = I   1 competitors of rm i together o¤er at least m units at price
p. We also introduce
' i (p;m+ 1) = ' i (p;m)  ' i (p;m+ 1) ;
the probability that competitors of rm i together o¤er exactly m units at price
p.
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Lemma 13 In an oligopoly market
Zi (n; p; i) = nh
NP
m=0
' i (p;m+ 1) f ((n+m)h)
 h (p  cn(i))
NP
m=0
@' i(p;m+1)
@p
F ((n+m  1)h) ;
(53)
where Zi (n; p; i) is dened.
Proof. (Lemma 13) An o¤er of n units at price p by producer i is rejected if
the competitors together o¤er exactly m units at the price p when demand is at
most n+m  1 units. Thus
	i (n; p) =
NX
m=0
' i (p;m+ 1)F ((n+m  1)h) : (54)
(53) now follows from Denition 1, Lemma 1 and (54).
Consider an outcome with price p, where the K competitors of producer i
together sell m units. In case of step separation this means that one of the com-
petitors will sell either bm = lm
K
m
units or bm  1 units at this price.
Lemma 14 Consider step-separated o¤ers that are symmetric ex-ante (before pri-
vate signals have been observed) from K competitors, then ' i (p;m+ 1) can be
determined from a binomial distribution.
' i (p;m+ 1)
=

K
m K(bm  1)

(b (p; bm))m K(bm 1) (1  b (p; bm))K bm m
if (bm  1)K  m  bmK and b(p; bm) 2 (0; 1). Moreover,
' i (p;m+ 1) = 0; (55)
if m < (bm  1)K and m > bmK.
Proof. ' i (p;m+ 1) is the probability that competitors together sell ex-
actly m units at price p. Competitorso¤ers are symmetric ex-ante and have step
separation. Moreover, the price is such that b(p; bm) 2 (0; 1). It follows that each
producer sells either bm units (with probability b (bm; p)) or bm  1 units at price p
(with probability 1   b (bm; p)). This immediately gives (55). It also follows that
m K(bm  1) producers are selling exactly bm units and the other producers are
selling exactly bm   1 units. There are  K
m K(bm  1)

such outcomes each
34
occurring with a probability (b (bm; p))m K(bm 1) (1  b (p; bm))K bm m, which gives
the result.
Note that the binomial coe¢ cient in Lemma 14 is dened as follows:
K
m K(bm  1)

=
K!
(m K(bm  1))! (K bm m)! : (56)
It follows from Lemma 13 and Lemma 14 that:
Corollary 3 In an oligopoly market where producer i has K = I   1 competitors
that submit step-separated o¤ers that are symmetric ex-ante (before private signals
have been observed), then
Zi (n; p; i)
= nh
K bmP
m=K(bm 1)

K
m K(bm  1)

(b (p; bm))m K(bm 1) (1  b (p; bm))K bm m f ((n+m)h)
 h (p  cn(i))
K bmP
m=K(bm 1)

K
m K(bm  1)

@((b(p;bm))m K( bm 1)(1 b(p;bm))K bm m)
@p
F ((n+m  1)h)
for p, such that b (p; bm) 2 (0; 1), and i 2 (0; 1).
Proof. (Proposition 3) In an equilibrium that is symmetric ex-ante, we have
n = bm. Hence, Corollary 3 gives the following symmetric rst-order condition:
n
KnX
m=K(n 1)
w (b;m K(n  1)) f ((n+m)h)
= (p  cn) @
@p
0@ KnX
m=K(n 1)
w (b;m K(n  1))F ((n+m  1)h)
1A ;
where we write
w (u; t) =

K
t

ut (1  u)T t
for the probability of t out of K to be chosen where each component has a prob-
ability u of being chosen. So after di¤erentiation
n
p  cn
KnX
m=K(n 1)
w (b;m K(n  1)) f ((n+m)h)
=
@b
@p
KnX
m=K(n 1)+1
w (b;m K(n  1))b (m K(n  1))F ((n+m  1)h)
 @b
@p
Kn 1X
m=K(n 1)
w (b;m K(n  1))
1  b (Kn m)F ((n+m  1)h) :
The di¤erential equation above can be written in the following form:
n
p  cn = g ()
d
dp
; (57)
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where
g (u) =
KnP
m=K(n 1)+1
w (u;m K(n  1)) (m K(n  1))F ((n+m  1)h)
u
KnP
m=K(n 1)
w (u;m K(n  1)) f ((n+m)h)
 
Kn 1P
m=K(n 1)
w (u;m K(n  1)) (Kn m)F ((n+m  1)h)
(1  u)
KnP
m=K(n 1)
w (u;m K(n  1)) f ((n+m)h)
:
We can simplify this to:
g (u) =
K 1P
v=0
w (u; v + 1) (v + 1)F ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
u
K 1P
v=0
w (u; v) f ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
 
K 1P
v=0
w (u; v) (K   v)F ((n+ v +K(n  1)  1)h)
(1  u)
K 1P
v=0
w (u; v) f ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
:
Next, we use (56) to simplify this further.
g (u) =
K 1P
v=0
K!
v!(K v 1)!u
v (1  u)K 1 v F ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
K 1P
v=0
w (u;K; v) f ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
 
K 1P
v=0
K!
v!(K v 1)!u
v (1  u)K 1 v F ((n+ v +K(n  1)  1)h)
K 1P
v=0
w (u;K; v) f ((n+ v +K(n  1))h)
;
which can be simplied to (15). The di¤erential equation in (57) can be separated
as follows:
ndp
p  cn = g (u) du:
We integrate the left hand side from pn () to pn (1) and the right-hand side from
 to 1. Hence,
n ln

pn (1)  cn
pn ()  cn

=
Z 1

g (u) du;
which gives (14). Using Corollary 3 in Appendix E, it can be veried that this is
an equilibrium with a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.
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